FARRELL TILL AND THE INCONSISTENCY OF INERRANCY (part II)
=========================================================
II. THE CASE FOR CONSISTENCY
------------------------
Till's claim, you will recall, is that the propositions
(A1) God is omnipotent
(A2) God is omniscient and
(A3) There is more than one inerrant gospel record
comprise a logically inconsistent set; it is impossible that the conjunction of these propositions be true. In particular, Till assumes that
(A4) Necessarily, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then there will
be exactly one inerrant gospel record (if any).
Accordingly, he feels that anyone who believes set A is irrational. Now, in part I, I argued that Till fails entirely in his attempt to prove (A4). At this point, the inerrantist might well be inclined to simply put up her feet and wait for Till to get his arguments together. But it seems to me that she can press the matter, showing not only that Till has failed to carry his case, but that what he has said is in fact _false_. In other words, I think it can be shown that
(A5) Possibly, God is omnipotent and omniscient and there is more than
one inerrant gospel record (if any).
To this end, consider the following two propositions:
(A5a) Libertarianism is true.
(A5b) The libertarian version of the inerrancy doctrine entails (i) that
the gospel writers were free in a libertarian sense with respect
to the composition of their records, and (ii) that (taken
together) the four gospels provide a complete and inerrant account
of what God wants us to know w.r.t. a certain set of events.
Now libertarianism is true only if it is logically impossible that there is an individual X, action A, and time t such that X is free w.r.t. A at t and X is causally determined to take (refrain from) A at t.
It seems to me uncontroversially true that (A5a) and (A5b) are compossible -- that is, each is possible and their conjunction is possible. But if so, then so too is
(A5c) It is not within God's power to _cause_ exactly one inerrant
gospel record to be _freely_ recorded.
For if libertarianism is true, then it is logically impossible that anyone be caused to freely do anything. It is worth pointing out, by the way, that (A5c) does nothing to impugn God's power. There are plenty of things that are logically possible, but which neither you, nor I, nor God can accomplish. For example, _writing Farrell Till's autobiography_ is a possible task; but neither you, nor I, nor God has the power to perform that task; only Till can write his autobiography. But this is no slight on _our_ power, since it's logically impossible for us to write Till's autobiography. It is at best extremely difficult to see how my not being able to draw a square circle imposes a limitation on my power. As Richard Swinburne puts it, to think otherwise
arises from regarding a logically impossible action as an action of one
kind on a par with an action of another kind, the logically possible.
But it is not. A logically impossible action is not an action. It is
what is described by a form of words which purport to describe an
action, but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose
could be done. (_The Coherence of Theism_. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977, p.149)
In general, therefore, if _X does A_ is logically impossible, then X's not being able to do A is no restriction on X's power.
Accordingly, if libertarianism is true, God (though omnipotent) cannot cause, say, Matthew, to freely compose a perfect gospel record which communicates _all_ of what God wants us to know about a given set of events. But then it seems distinctly possible that
(A5d) For every possible person S and world W, if S were instantiated in
W and left free w.r.t. composing an inerrant gospel record, S
would not freely record _all_ of what God wants us to know w.r.t.
a certain set of events.
If so, then for all we know
(A5e) God has actualized a world containing some (freely composed)
inerrant gospel records, but the least number required for
communicating _all_ of what God wants us to know w.r.t. a certain
set of events
is also possible. We are now in a position to establish the consistency of set A. It seems clear that each of (A5c), (A5d), and (A5e) is possible. Further, the conjunction of these propositions is a possible proposition, and is consistent with God's being omnipotent and omniscient -- i.e., with (A1) and (A2). But this set of propositions -- i.e., {(A1),(A2),(A5c),(A5d),(A5e)} -- entails that there is more than one inerrant gospel record; it entails that (A3) is true. Hence, there is no contradiction in set A.
What we have done, in other words, is to describe a possible state of affairs (namely, (A5c-e)) which clearly entails that there is more than one inerrant gospel record and yet is clearly compatible with God's being omnipotent and omniscient, thus showing that
(A5) Possibly, God is omnipotent and omniscient and there is more than
one inerrant gospel record (if any)
is true, and hence that
(A4) Necessarily, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then there will
be exactly one inerrant gospel record (if any)
is false. We can now see that in asserting (A4) Till has made two crucial mistakes. First, although he vigorously asserts (A4), he fails to provide sound philosophical arguments to support it. This is most unfortunate, since (A4) is a _philosophical_ truth claim. And secondly, in asserting (A4), Till has affirmed something demonstrably _false_.
III. CONCLUSION
----------
Till's philosophical case for the irrationality of inerrancy presents us with a clear example of someone, who in his zeal to refute the inerrantist, makes claims that either cannot be supported or a plainly false. He wants us to believe that anyone who believes in inerrancy is irrational given that they believe set A. But Till is completely unable to prove that set A is inconsistent. And there's a good reason for that, namely, the fact that set A isn't inconsistent; it's a demonstrably consistent set.
Now if Till cannot show the inerrantist that set A is inconsistent, and if in fact set A is consistent, then it follows that (so far as Till's arguments are concerned) it is not irrational to believe set A.
Of course, it might be objected to all of this that Till's arguments are not directed at the logician or philosopher, but rather at the lay person who is by all accounts a philosophical and logical neophyte. The lay person has a limited philosophical vocabulary and uses such terms as `inconsistent' and `irrational' in their lay senses (i.e., non-philosophical senses). Hence, my arguments against Till are misplaced, assuming (as they do) that Till is using these terms in their philosophical senses.
It seems to me that there are two problems with this objection. First, if Till is going use terms like `inconsistent' in their non-logical senses, then (to be consistent) he's going to have to redefine a host of other logical terms such as `entails', `deduce', `valid', and `invalid'.
In logic, a valid argument preserves truth from premises to conclusion; that is, necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Or more to the point: an argument is valid just in case the set consisting of the premises and the negation of the conclusion is inconsistent. But if Till defines `inconsistent' in lay terms, then is he also going to define `valid' and `invalid' in such terms? What could it mean when Till tells us that he's giving us _valid_ arguments? Does it mean that, necessarily, if the premises of his arguments are true, the conclusions are also be true? Not if he's defining things in lay terms. Here it looks as though Till owes us a complete glossary of terms; otherwise, his `lay discourse' seems to be nothing but a nest of confusion.
On the other hand, if he lets these `logical terms' have their logical senses, then what justification is there for not letting `inconsistent' and `irrational' have their logical senses? None so far as I can see. If this is the way Till wants to go therefore, it seems as though he's just engaging in so much arbitrary picking and choosing.
The second problem with the objection is that it is simply a red herring. I'm not disputing the fact that Till is talking to an audience of lay persons. But how does that affect the soundness (or lack thereof) of my arguments? How does that show that my arguments against Till are either invalid or unsound? It doesn't. It's just a way of dismissing my arguments without dealing with them. I would be much more impressed if Till were to use philosophically precise terms when he is talking with philosophers, and lay terms when he is addressing that audience. But he seems always to have a lay audience on hand. In a way, this is rather convenient, since then he has a ready-made justification for never using a philosophically precise vocabulary.
My two posts are not intended to show that Till isn't persuasive on the popular, lay level. For all I know, he is. Rather, they are meant to show that Till's case for the irrationality of inerrancy is _philosophically_ bankrupt. No serious student of logic or philosophy should be impressed by it. Hence, no thoughtful person should claim (or be taken in by the claim) that Till has offerred us a knock-down argument for the conclusion that belief in inerrancy is irrational. This is hardly the case.
************************************************************************
| Richard Davis, PhD (Cand), Dept of Philosophy, U Toronto, 215 Huron |
| St, M5S 1A1, Ph: (905) 727-0361, Email: davis@epas.utoronto.ca |
************************************************************************