I like this. Good ideas.
Don
>Date: Wed, 18 Oct 95 23:16 CDT
>Reply-to: errancy@atheist.tamu.edu
>From: lcot@infosphere.com (Lance Cote)
>To: Multiple recipients of list <errancy@atheist.tamu.edu>
>Subject: Re: Extraordinary evidence
>Don writes:
>
>>Personally, I agree with you, Farrell, that it is not *unreasonable*
>>-- but that doesn't mean that it is *advisable* to use this assertion.
>>I think that Horner made some real points with the audience on this
>>one when he asked you what would constitute "extraordinary evidence"
>>and then proceeded to make the "evidence" look as unlikely as the
>>claim. What I am saying is that there might be better terminology.
>>
>>>An extraordinary claim doesn't necessarily have to be a miracle
>>>claim, but if it is, I think it is reasonable to argue that such a
>>>claim can never be proven.
>>
><snip>
>>Don
>>
>>
>
>Perhaps a better way to talk about the subject is not by characterizing
>the evidence as good, very good, extraordinary, miraculous or whatever
>and instead focus on the height of the burden. As a lawyer, this is
>how I am used to addressing an issue such as the one under discussion.
>
>For example, in a normal civil case facts must be proven by a
>preponderance of the evidence. This means that a given fact is more
>likely than not based on all the evidence presented good or miraculous.
> In some states to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must show
>facts justifying an award by "clear and convincing evidence". As OJ
>demonstrated yet a different standard is applied in a criminal case.
>
>Applying this to the extraordinary Xian claims, you could insist that
>the burden be carried beyond a reasonable doubt based on the gravity of
>the matter asserted. Whereas in the flat tire example a preponderance
>of the evidence would carry the day. In this way you can focus on the
>level of persuasiveness of the evidence rather than disputing if it is
>extraordinary or not. With respect to the Resurrection, however the
>evidence is characterized it does not persuade beyond a reasonable
>doubt.
>
>To highlight the difference between burden and characterization,
>consider this:
>
>We have the gospel accounts of the resurrection and the alleged 500
>witnesses in support of the Xian claim. If our standard is
>preponderence this may be carry the burden and someone may conclude
>that it is more likely than not that the resurrection occurred. But
>can we say beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence "demands a
>verdict"? Not where the gospel writers showed bias and a lack of first
>hand knowledge, we cannot.
>
>It seems that focusing on how to characterization the evidence
>distracts from the real purpose of the inquiry. Does this evidence
>persuade beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of how it is
>characterized. So often in trials we spend our time weighing
>credibility and arguing inferences from evidence. We make these
>arguments with an eye to persuading that the relevant burden has or has
>not been met, not for the purpose of classifying any piece of evidence
>in the abstract.
>
>I recognize that the courtroom and the podium of public debate are very
>different. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to flesh out this argument
>and see if it would assist those of us who do engage in public debate.
>
>
>Lance
>
>